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Malpractice Used as a Hospital Defense
Carl H. Miller*
H OSPITAL IMMUNITY IN NEGLIGENCE and other torts of agents
and employees is disappearing steadily. The course of de-
cisions in many states has been consistently in the direction of
elimination of "charitable" immunity of hospitals.'
Seeking another line of defense, hospital administrators have
re-examined the parties generally involved in a medical neg-
ligence action-patient, physician and hospital. Hospital adminis-
trators realized quickly that in order to remain free from general
negligence liability, the main onus of tort responsibility would
have to be shifted to the physician (or even the nurse) whenever
and wherever possible.
The first step necessary to this end was the disassociation of
the hospital-physician relation from the broad principle that an
employer is liable to a third person for any injury which proxi-
mately results from tortious conduct of an employee acting with-
in the scope of his employment.2 This disassociation took many
forms and they met with varying degrees of success. The most
successful revolved around the theory that the hospital-physician
relation was not that of master-servant, but rather of principal
and independent contractor.3 This theory had as a base the argu-
ment that inasmuch as hospitals, generally corporations, are not
competent to practice medicine, they can in no way control, and
* B.S., Case Institute of Technology; Third-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 For an analysis of this particular phase see Holdridge, Tort Liability of
Hospitals, 8 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 394 (1959). See also Lipson, Charitable
Immunity: The Plague of Modern Tort Concepts, 7 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev.
483 (1958). In regard to strictly charitable hospitals see 25 ALR 2d 29. For
immunity of government hospitals see 25 ALR 2d 203.
2 35 Am. Jur., Master & Servant § 552.
3 Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 SW 397 (1921); Jeter v. Davis-
Fischer Sanitarium Co., 28 Ga. App. 708, 113 S. E. 29 (1922); Jenkins v.
Charleston General Hospital and Training School, 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S. E.
560 (1922); Holland v. Eugene Hospital, 127 Or. 256, 270 P. 784 (1928);
Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. v. Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S. E. 2d 153 (1939);
Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P. 2d 372 (1944); Wilson v. Martin
Memorial Hospital, 232 N. C. 362, 61 S. E. 2d 102 (1950); Van Cleave v.
Irby, 204 Okla. 689, 233 P. 2d 963 (1951); Privar v. Manhattan General,
279 App. Div. 522, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 786 (1952); Jones v. New York ,-----.. Sup.
.... 134 N. Y. S. 2d 779 (1954), rev. on other grnds. 286 App. Div. 825,
143 N. Y. S. 2d 628; Lewis v. Columbus Hospital, 1 App. Div. 2d 444, 151
N. Y. S. 2d 391 (1956); Huber v. Protestant Deaconess Hospital Assoc.,
127 Ind. App. 565, 133 N. E. 2d 864 (1956); Mayers v. Litow, 154 Cal. App.
2d 413, 316 P. 2d 351 (1957); Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 308 N. Y.
116, 123 N. E. 2d 801 (1954); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N. Y. 2d 656, 163 N. Y. S.
2d 3, 143 N. E. 2d 3 (1957), which abolished this theory in New York; Brad-
shaw v. Iowa Methodist Hospital, 101 N. W. 2d 167 (Iowa, 1960).
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therefore cannot be responsible for, the professional medical
acts of their staff members.4
Another theory, used primarily in regard to operating room
torts5 and in a few post-operative situations,6 results from the
concept that the surgeon in charge of an operation has complete
control of everyone assisting him in the operating room. 7 Hos-
pitals, taking full advantage of agency law in this particular in-
stance, argue that with control comes responsibility and there-
fore the surgeon is chargeable with the negligence of hospital
employees assisting him. This theory has, in some cases,8 been
repudiated by courts holding that certain duties are routine and
so much a part of standard hospital practice that to hold the
surgeon liable would place an undue burden upon the already
burdened practitioner.
Where the primary physician-patient relation is with a doc-
tor maintaining his own practice, hospitals have been quick to
point out to the courts that this established the basic responsi-
bility for any negligence on the part of the physician.9 This is
4 View largely limited to New York where it originated in Schloendorf v.
Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914). Refined
further in Phillip v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199
(1924). See also Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y.
163, 7 N. E. 2d 286 (1937); Berg v. New York Society for Relief of the
Ruptured and Crippled, 1 N. Y. 2d 499, 136 N. E. 2d 523 (1956) which sheds
doubt on the administrative-professional distinction, which has been
abandoned in Bing v. Thunig, supra n. 3. Also note Swigert v. City of
Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N. W. 2d 217 (1956); Benedict v. Bondi, 384
Pa. 574, 122 A. 2d 209 (1956).
5 Morey v. Thybo, 199 F. 760, 42 L. R. A., N. S., 785 (7th Cir. 1912); Beck
v. German Klinik, 78 Iowa 696, 43 N. W. 617, 7 L. R. A. 566 (1889); St.
Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 212 Minn. 558, 4 N. W.
2d 637 (1942); Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 Pac. 752 (1923);
Minogue v. Rutland Hospital, 119 Vt. 336, 125 A. 2d 796 (1956); Hillyer v.
Governor of St. Bartholomew's Hospital, 2 K. B. 820 (1909); Johnson v.
Ely, 30 Tenn. App. 294, 205 S. W. 2d 759 (1947); Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d
82, 64 P. 2d 409 (1936); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687,
162 A. L. R. 1258 (1944); Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726 (La. App.,
1922); Randolph v. Oklahoma City General Hospital, 180 Okla. 513, 71 P.
2d 607 (1937); Simons v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 94 Mont. 355, 22 P.
2d 609 (1933); Emerson v. Chapman, 138 Okla. 270, 280 P. 820 (1929);
Wallstedt v. Swedish Hospital, 220 Minn. 274, 19 N. W. 2d 426 (1945); Stein-
ert v. Brunswick Home, Inc., 172 Misc. 787, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 83 (1939); Yor-
ston v. Pennell, 153 A. 2d 255 (Pa., 1959).
6 Davis v. Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P. 2d 318 (1931); McConnell v. Williams,
361 Pa. 355, 65 A. 2d 243 (1949).
7 See 60 A. L. R. 147.
8 Covington v. Wyatt, 196 N. C. 367, 145 S. E. 673 (1928); Harris v. Fall,
177 F. 79, 27 L. R. A., N. S. 1174 (7th Cir., 1910); Harlan v. Bryant, 87 F.
2d 170 (7th Cir., 1936); Hohenthal v. Smith, 72 App. D. C. 343, 114 F. 2d
494 (D. C. Cir., 1940); Stewart v. Manasses, 224 Pa. 221, 90 A. 574 (1914).
9 Barfield v. South Highlands Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915);
Hendrickson v. Hodkin, 250 App. Div. 619, 294 N. Y. S. 982, revd. on other
(Continued on next page)
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MALPRACTICE AS DEFENSE
generally argued from the point that (1) hospitals only furnish
the facilities,1" and (2) the physician has contractually (express-
ly or impliedly) assumed the liability for his patient's safety.
The newest line of defense by hospital administrators is
through the use of physicians' malpractice itself. Although the
idea of using the malpractice of a physician as a defense is basical-
ly not new," the attrition of charitable immunity has brought it
into prominence as an effective defensive weapon. The advantages
in obtaining from the court a ruling that an injury was the
result of malpractice instead of negligence can best be illustrated
by several recent cases.
In Morwin v. Albany Hospital"2 the hospital, in view of a
decision 1" which abolished the rule that a staff doctor was to be
considered an independent contractor, had been held liable for
the negligence of a staff doctor under the theory of respondeat
superior. The charge to the jury had been a general negligence
charge and on appeal the reviewing court reversed the decision
on the basis of that charge being erroneous. The court held that
medical acts and the negligent performance thereof, for which
the hospital was being held liable, fell into classification of neg-
ligence known as malpractice. Malpractice is defined1 4 generally
as bad, wrong, or injudicious treatment of a patient, professionally
and in respect to the particular disease or injury, resulting in
injury, unnecessary suffering or death to the patient, and pro-
ceeding from ignorance, carelessness, want of proper professional
skill, disregard of established rules or principles, neglect, or a
malicious or criminal intent. Since malpractice does require an
answer to whether an act was carried out with sufficient pro-
fessional skill and knowledge, it naturally requires expert testi-
mony to the effect that what was done was negligent, or could
have been done better or in another way. The charge having
been one of general negligence, and expert testimony not having
(Continued from preceding page)
grnds. 276 N. Y. 252, 11 N. E. 2d 899; Gosnell v. Southern Ry. Co., 202 N. C.
234, 162 S. E. 569 (1932); Bowditch v. French Broad Hospital, 201 N. C. 168,
159 S. E. 350 (1931); Penland v. French Broad Hospital, 199 N. C. 314, 154
S. E. 406 (1930); O'Rourke v. Halcyon Rest, 281 App. Div. 838, 118 N. Y. S.
2d 693, aff'd 306 N. Y. 692, 117 N. E. 2d 639 (1953); Konoff v. Fraser, 62
Cal. App. 2d 788, 145 P. 2d 368 (1944); Mayers v. Litow, 154 Cal. App. 2d
413, 316 P. 2d 351 (1957); Fowler v. Norways Sanitarium, 112 Ind. App.
347, 42 N. E. 2d 415 (1942); Carter v. Harlem Hospital, 278 Ky. 87, 128
S. W. 2d 174 (1939); Jackson v. Mountain Sanitarium & Asheville Agri-
cultural School, 234 N. C. 222, 67 S. E. 2d 57 (1951); Stewart v. Crook
Sanitarium, 17 Tenn. App. 589, 69 S. W. 2d 259 (1933); Kuglich v. Fowle,
185 Wis. 124, 200 N. W. 648 (1924).
10 Mayers v. Litow & Midway Hospital, supra n. 3.
11 Harding v. Liberty Hospital Corp., 177 Cal. 520, 171 P. 98 (1918).
12 7 A. D. 2d 582, 185 N. Y. S. 2d 85, 88 (1959).
13 Bing v. Thunig, supra, n. 3.
14 Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1957).
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been introduced, the court concluded that the jury should have
found the hospital not liable, and reversed the decision of the
lower court.
This case illustrates well several of the reasons that make
malpractice a potent defensive argument. In pleading malprac-
tice, hospitals are advantageously served by the increased dif-
ficulty of proof that the plaintiff must overcome to win his case.
A negligence action is generally within the scope of knowledge
and experience of the average layman; but malpractice removes
the charge from this level and by its nature necessitates the in-
troduction of expert testimony. 15 The difficulties which may arise
in a situation involving expert medical testimony have been re-
iterated so often' as to preclude the necessity for any further
discussion. Contiguous with this problem, however, one cannot
overlook the increased expense of litigation, an all too real
stumbling block in the path of many a plaintiff.
In Davis v. Eubanks17 the negligent injection of penicillin
brought an injury action by the patient's administratrix against
a nurse and the hospital. The hospital in its answer maintained
it was in a demurrable position inasmuch as the statute of limita-
tions for malpractice' provided a bar to the action. The argu-
ment was defensively successful and the court held that a nurse
could be guilty of malpractice within the meaning of the statute
of limitations, which provided that an action must be brought
within one year of the accrual of the cause. The court went on
to point out that where the statute of limitations was effective
as a bar to the action against the nurse, an employee of the
hospital, it was also effective as a bar to the action against the
hospital. This case points out what is probably the most attractive
consideration in the use of malpractice as a hospital defense.
That is, generally, the statute of limitations limits the time avail-
able to bring the action to a shorter period in malpractice than
in negligence.
This extension of the meaning of malpractice to include
nurses19 is a breakthrough in its use as a defensive weapon.
Prior to this a long line of decisions had, in general, consistently
held that the negligence of nurses would fall upon either the hos-
15 Prosser, Torts 134 (2nd ed. 1955).
16 Oleck, A Cure for Doctor-Lawyer Frictions, 7 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 473
(1958); Lamppert, Medical Evidence and Testimony, 8 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev.
465 (1959).
17 167 N. E. 2d 386 (Ohio, 1960).
18 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.11.
19 Parowski v. Bridgeport Hospital, ____ Conn. .. 134 A. 2d 834 (1957);
citing McDermott v. St. Mary's Hospital Corporation, 144 Conn. 417, 133 A.
2d 608 (1957). Non-liability of the hospital for the negligence of a practical
nurse, see Penaloza v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, ____ Tex. ___ 304 S. W.
2d 203 (1957). See also Hayt, Law of Hospital & Nurse (1955).
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pital,20 or under the borrowed servant doctrine, upon the direct-
ing physicians.2 1 Typifying the majority position, we find Isen-
stein v. Malcomson,2 2 in which the hospital requested that the
complaint be dismissed on the ground that the action, against a
hospital for the negligence of a nurse, was not brought within
the two year period required by the statute of limitations in
malpractice actions. The court rejected this contention, holding
that malpractice must be considered in its primary meaning; and
according to such usage and acceptance, it has regularly been in-
tended to import improper treatment or culpable neglect of a
patient by a physician or surgeon. The court went on to state
that in no instance had it been found to have possible application
to a nurse.
Additional impetus for the growing use of defensive mal-
practice comes from the increased possibility of practical and
procedural error2 3 by the plaintiff; not to mention the conceiv-
ability of a confusion of issues in the minds of the jurors, which
is illustrated below.
The extremes to which several courts have been persuaded
to go in accepting the hospital's use of defensive malpractice are
worth noting. In Robinson v. Crotwel124 the plaintiff submitted
to an operation to relieve a disease of the nerve, tic douloureux,
upon the suggestion of the physician-owner of the hospital. As
a result of the operation the plaintiff was left permanently dis-
figured and with a 21/2 inch by 1Y inch hole in his skull. In an
appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, the court held that the
20 Jones v. Baylor Hospital, 9 Tex. Civ. 66, 284 S. W. 2d 929 (1956);
Baptist Memorial Hospital v. McTighe, --- Tex .... 303 S. W. 2d 446
(1951); Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N. E. 2d 410(1956); Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951);
Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934, affd. 180 Kan.
23, 299 P. 2d 38 (1956); Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 46 Del. 350, 83 A.
2d 753 (1951); Wheat v. Idaho Latter D.-y Saint's Hospital, ____ Idaho ___
297 P. 2d 1041 (1956); Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933),
negligent injection; Norwood Hospital v. Brown, 219 Ala. 445, 122 So. 411
(1929), overheated water bottle; Williams v. Pamona Valley Hospital Ass'n.,
21 Cal. App. 359, 131 Pac. 888 (1913), overheated water bottle; City of
Shawnee v. Roush, 101 Okla. 60, 223 P. 354 (1923), enema of too high a
temperature; Session v. Thomas E. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 94 Utah
460, 78 P. 2d 645 (1938), incorrect medication; Malcolm v. Evangelical
Lutheran Hospital Ass'n., 107 Neb. 101, 185 N. W. 330 (1921), incorrect
medication; Skidmore v. Oklahoma Hospital, 137 Okla. 133, 278 P. 334
(1929), failure to catheterize; Welsh v. Mercy Hospital, 65 Cal. App. 2d 473,
151 P. 2d 17 (1944), failure to warn patient when lowering bed; Flower
Hospital v. Hart, 178 Okla. 477, 62 P. 2d 1248 (1936); Goff v. Doctor's Gen-
eral Hospital of San Jose, 333 P. 2d 29 (Calif. 1958); Pierce v. Yakima
Valley Memorial Hospital, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765 (1956).
21 Minogue v. Rutland Hospital, supra, n. 5.
22 227 App. Div. 66, 236 N. Y. S. 641, 643 (1929).
23 Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P. 2d 170
(1957); Lustig v. Beth Israel Hospital, 195 N. Y. S. 2d 441 (1959).
24 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911).
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physician-owner of the hospital could not be held liable for the
malpractice of the operating surgeon since the only thing he did
was to administer the anesthetic and advise against the com-
pletion of the operation due to the patient's ebbing vitality. The
court added that the fact that the operating room was so in-
adequately furnished as to be partially responsible for the in-
completion of the operation was the responsibility of the surgeon
and not that of the physician-owner. Black v. Fischer25 brought
to the court a situation where the offending physician was also
the managing stockholder of the defendant sanitarium. The sani-
tarium demurred on the ground that if there was any liability, it
was upon the surgeon and not the hospital. In sustaining this
point the court speciously declared that there was no control of
the agent sufficient to hold the master liable for his torts.
In most states the use of malpractice as a defensive tool, to
replace charitable immunity, is limited by the theory that, under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, a hospital will be held liable
for the negligence or malpractice of its physicians.26 The destruc-
tion of the independent contractor idea for the non-liability of
hospitals, however, still leaves the most important advantage,
that of a short statute of limitations. This aspect of the problem
requires some detailed consideration.
It would be contrary to the basic rules of agency for a
court to hold a hospital liable for the torts of an agent, after
the statute of limitations had erected a bar to an action against
that particular agent. The most obvious approach then, since
the limitations rule is statutory, is to seek a change through the
25 30 Ga. App. 109, 117 S. E. 103 (1923); see also Barfield v. South Highland
Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915); Jeter v. Davis-Fischer Sanitorium
Co., supra n. 3; in Runyan v. Goodrum, supra n. 3, hospital was held not
liable for negligence on the part of an x-ray technician who was not a
doctor because of the special knowledge technician supposedly had.
26 Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879);
Brown v. La Societe Francaise, 138 Cal. 475, 71 P. 516 (1903); Vaughan v.
Memorial Hospital, 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S. E. 481 (1925); Gilstrap v. Osteo-
pathic Sanitorium Co., 224 Mo. App. 798, 24 S. W. 2d 249 (1929); Bellandi v.
Park Sanitarium Ass'n., 214 Cal. 472, 6 P. 2d 508 (1931); Edwards v. West
Texas Hospital, 89 S. W. 2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App., 1935); Hansch v. Hacket,
190 Wash. 97, 66 P. 2d 1129 (1937); White v. Central Dispensary & Emer-
gency Hospital, 69 App. D. C. 122, 99 F. 2d 355, 119 A. L. R. 1002 (1938);
Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. v. Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S. E. 2d 153 (1939);
Giusti v. C. H. Weston Co., 165 Or. 525, 108 P. 2d 1010 (1941); Treptau v.
Behrens Spa, 247 Wis. 438, 20 N. W. 2d 108 (1945); Rice v. California Lu-
theran Hospital, 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P. 2d 860 (1945) ; Grigalauskas v. United
States, 103 F. Supp. 543 (D. C. Mass., 1951); Lexington Hospital, Inc. v.
White, 245 S. W. 2d 927 (Ky., 1952); Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54
N. W. 2d 639, 57 A. L. R. 2d 364 (1952); Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N. C.
116, 72 S. E. 2d 4 (1952); Bowers v. Olch, 120 Cal. App. 2d 108, 260 P. 2d
997 (1953); Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hospital, 65 So. 2d 40 (Fla., 1953);
Garfield Memorial Hospital v. Marshall, 92 App. D. C. 234, 204 F. 2d 721,
37 A. L. R. 2d 1270 (D. C. Cir., 1953); Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla.,
1954); Seneri v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P. 2d 915, 53 A. L. R. 2d 124
(1955); Bing v. Thunig, supra n. 3; Brown v. Moore, 247 F. 2d 711 (3rd
Cir. 1957).
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legislative process. Here another fallacy arises, well illustrated
by two recent legislative enactments. In New Jersey a decision
rendered in 1958 in Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary27
ended the charitable immunity that hospitals in that state had en-
joyed up until that time. In 1959, even before enough time had
elapsed for a decent burial, the state legislature of New Jersey
limited the liability of charitable hospitals to $10,000.28 Similarly,
the Kansas courts voided the charitable theory of immunity in
Noel v. Menninger Foundation.29 Shortly thereafter, the state
legislators saw fit to restore immunity by limiting hospital li-
ability to the extent of the insurance carried by each particular
hospital.30 This leaves the determination of hospital liability
solely in the hands of the hospital administrators, a perfect solu-
tion from the viewpoint of hospital administrators. To think that
statutes of limitations will be lengthened by state legislatures re-
quires a naive view of the influence of various medical lobbying
groups, and extreme optimism in regard to legislative liberality.
Some of the advantages of hospitals, as to defensive mal-
practice, are threatened by the theory that a hospital may be
liable for the professional acts of its staff. In Seneri v. Haas3 '
paralysis developed from the negligent injection of a spinal
anesthetic. The court discarded the various immunity theories
and claimed that it was for the jury to determine whether the
anesthesiologist was the "ostensible agent" of the hospital. If
so, the hospital would be liable for the negligent acts of the
anesthesiologist. The court went on to say that the patient was
not on notice and had no duty to inquire as to agency relations,
but could generally look to the hospital for medical services,
which included the acts of its professional staff. In Brown v.
Moore32 a patient in a proprietary sanitorium, shortly after elec-
tro-shock treatment, was permitted to walk about. During the
course of this walking about, he fell down a flight of stairs and
broke his neck. The district court held that the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior did not apply. On appeal this was reversed
by the circuit court. The court held that whether the partners
who operated the sanitorium held out or represented the physi-
cian to be their employee to administer treatment to the patient,
so as to render them liable under respondeat superior, was for
the jury to decide. Whether or not these two decisions will
establish a trend still remains to be seen, but they do seem in
keeping with the erosion of charitable immunity.33
27 27 N. J. 29, 141 A. 2d 276 (1958).
28 Ch. 90, Laws 1959.
29 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954).
30 S. B. 239.
31 Supra n. 26.
32 Supra n. 26. Originating action in 143 F. Supp. 816.
33 For a state by state analysis of the present status of charitable immunity
see Horty, Hospital Law Manual (Vol. 2, 1959).
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Malpractice on several occasions has been found to be a
double edged weapon, much to the woe of hospital administrators.
In Clary v. Christiansen34 a practitioner vigorously defended a
malpractice charge, and returned the liability to the hospital.
The physician maintained that the nurse, in preparing the
operating room and supplies, was not his employee, and that her
negligence was attributable to the hospital as he had no right to
control and supervise. Similarly, a Tennessee court recently
held, in Rural Educational Ass'n. v. Bush,35 that a hospital was
liable, under respondeat superior, for an improper sponge count
conducted by the operating room nurse. The court reasoned il-
luminatingly that, although the surgeon is in complete control
of the operating room, certain duties of attending nurses "do not
involve professional skill or decision on the part of the surgeon."
That hospitals will continue to use malpractice defensively
seems clear. In many cases the practitioner's and/or patient's at-
torney will be unable to cope with this, but if he is to be in the
best possible position in protecting his client he must examine
closely the physician-hospital administrator relation.36 A reas-
sessment of that relation should then be worked into one of the
following avenues of argument: (1) Malpractice used defensively
is akin to the "administrative vs. medical act" distinction, which
has been rejected by the courts as impossibly confusing; 37 (2)
It violates the public policy which declares hospital liability to
be the same as that of any employer or principal; (3) It allows
administrators to subordinate physicians (who have little enough
actual control of hospitals) and to make scapegoats of physicians
and nurses; (4) It is an unwise division of negligence into "class
categories"; (5) It ignores the patient's actual reliance on the
hospital to which he pays fees; (6) It is not equitable in its effect.
A "horrible example" of the results of use of malpractice as
a defense is seen in a recent case: Weinstein v. Prostkoff. 33 There
a nurse anesthetist's negligence in carrying out an obstetrician's
orders to anesthetise a woman in childbirth apparently led to
the death of the woman in the delivery room. Thereafter a chain
of ugly events followed. The hospital records were altered. Hos-
pital personnel blamed the obstetrician, who was at most only
passively negligent, if that. At the trial, defense counsel misbe-
84 54 Ohio L. Abs. 254, 83 N. E. 2d 644 (1948). See also Shull v. Schwartz,
364 Pa. 554, 73 A. 2d 402 (1950).
35 ---- Tenn. Ct. App.. , 298 S. W. 2d 761 (1956). See also Olander v.
Johnson, 258 Ill. App. 89 (1930); Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hospital, __
Fla. Sup. Ct. ___ 65 So. 2d 40 (1953).
36 Oleck, Doctor, Lawyer, and Hospital Administrator: A New Triangle
8 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 416 (1959).
37 Bing v. Thunig, supra, n. 3; Berg v. New York Society for Relief of the
Ruptured & Crippled, supra, n. 4.
38 Weinstein v. Prostkoff, 23 Misc. (N. Y.) 2d 376 (Supr. Ct., Kings County,
decided Aug. 21, 1959; reported Sept. 28, 1960).
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haved. There was an all around mess of lying and of passing the
buck. The jury apparently was thoroughly confused by the mal-
practice aspects. It found the doctor liable, but not the nurse nor
the hospital. The judge set aside the verdict as a miscarriage of
justice, and ordered a new trial. It was a shocking illustration
of the worst possibilities of the "defense" of malpractice.
In Shutts v. Siehl,8 9 nurses refused to loosen a patient's cast
without the doctor's approval. The doctor did not approve the
patient's request, conveyed by the nurses. When harm to the
patient followed, the court directed a verdict for the hospital;
but a verdict for the doctor was reversed due to error in the in-
structions to the jury. The pattern of shifting the onus to the
doctor is visible in this case.
The final effect of hospital denial of the respondeat superior
principle, however, is found in Sands v. Klein.40 There a hospital
actually cross-claimed against the doctor, arguing that his neg-
ligence was active and its negligence was passive. The court
summarily brushed aside this argument, holding that both were
negligent, in that case, and that it was ineffective because they
were joint tort feasors in pari delicto. But the boldness of the at-
tempt is illuminating. In a very recent case4 ' the idea of active
vs. passive negligence, and indemnification of the hospital by the
doctor seems to be accepted.
The danger of the use of malpractice as a defense for hos-
pitals, at the expense of the professional staff members, as pre-
dicted,42 has become very apparent. It depends on the idea of
primary and secondary liability, where, as in New York, that
concept of indemnification is accepted.
39 10 Ohio Op. 2d 363, 109 Ohio App. 145 (decided 1959, reported 1960).
40 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 2d 236, 190 N. Y. S. 2d 262, affd. 7 N. Y. 2d 896, 197
N. Y. S. 2d 204 (1960).
41 Hollant v. North Shore Hospital, Inc., 206 N. Y. S. 2d 177 (1960).
42 Oleck, supra, n. 36.
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